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Impacts of “Three Strikes and You’re Out” on Crime Trends
in California and throughout the United States

Abstract
The impacts of Three Strikes on crime in California and throughout the U.S. are analyzed
using cross-sectional time series analysis of state-level data from 1986 to 2005. The model
measures both deterrence and incapacitation effects, controlling for pre-existing crime trends and
economic, demographic, and policy factors. Despite limited usage outside California, the
presence of a Three Strikes law appears to be associated with slightly but significantly faster
rates of decline in robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft nationwide. Three Strikes
is also associated with slower declines in murder rates. Although California’s law is the broadest
and most-frequently-used Three Strikes policy, it has not produced greater incapacitation effects
on crime than other states’ far more limited laws. The analyses indicate that the “toughest”
sentencing policy is not necessarily the most effective option.

Impacts of “Three Strikes and You’re Out” on Crime Trends
in California and throughout the United States
Introduction
Between the years 1993 and 1997, “Three Strikes and You’re Out” sentencing laws were
passed in twenty-four American states and the federal justice system.1 Three Strikes laws
mandate long sentences for certain habitual offenders, usually 25 years to life in prison for thirdtime violent offenders. Three Strikes statutes vary widely in their details, such as the type and
number of offenses that trigger the law’s application, the prior offenses that qualify as “strikes,”
and the penalties associated with second and third “strikes” (Austin, Clark, Hardyman, & Henry,
1999; Austin, Jones, Naro, & Cohen, 1996; Clark, Austin, & Henry, 1997). The broadest and
farthest-reaching Three Strikes statute was enacted by the state of California in 1994. As of
October 2005, over 87,500 individuals had been sentenced under the second- and third-strike
provisions of California’s Three Strikes law, including over 7,500 offenders who received a
sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison for a third strike (Legislative Analyst's Office,
2005). Because of its scope, California’s law has been associated with tremendous monetary and
social costs. This paper examines whether the law has produced commensurate reductions in
crime that would justify the costs and consequences associated with a policy of its breadth.
Prior Research on Three Strikes and its Impacts on Crime
Several studies of Three Strikes laws in California and elsewhere have been published
since the mid-1990s. One of the earliest studies, conducted at RAND before Three Strikes took
effect, predicted that California’s broad policy could reduce crime by about twenty-five percent
in the state, at a cost of about $5.5 billion per year, but that the benefits and the costs would
1
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depend on full implementation of the law, which the RAND researchers did not anticipate
(Greenwood et al., 1994).
Not long after the law went into effect, supporters of Three Strikes pointed to dramatic
declines in California’s crime rates following the law’s passage and claimed that Three Strikes
deserved credit for the changes (Ardaiz, 2000; Lungren, 1996, 1997; Reynolds, 1995). Mike
Reynolds, a former wedding photographer whose daughter’s murder had inspired him to coauthor the California Three Strikes law and campaign for its passage, stated bluntly, “the results
are in and the debate is over. The numbers prove that when you get tough, you get results”
(Reynolds, 1995). In a 1998 report, California Attorney General Dan Lungren credited the law
for California’s 20.2 percent total crime drop, and the 13.8 percent decline in violent crime from
1994 to 1997 (Lungren, 1998). Revisiting the issue in a 2005 report, Reynolds cited a 46 percent
decline in the index crime rate from 1992 to 2002 and again asserted that the data proved the
law’s success, proclaiming, “the reduction in crime that occurred after the passage of 3-Strikes
speaks for itself… any objective assessment would credit 3-Strikes with playing a major role in
California’s record crimes [sic] drops” (Reynolds, 2005).
On the other side of the issue, opponents have asserted that Three Strikes has caused little
or no impact on crime. A 1999 study released by the Justice Policy Institute (Males, Macallair,
& Taqi-Eddin, 1999) criticized the law strongly, calling it a “failure” and concluding that it had
had no effects on crime because declines in crime were not especially pronounced for (1) states
with Three Strikes, (2) counties in California reputed to apply the law particularly strictly, or (3)
the over-thirty age group, which ought to have been impacted most by Three Strikes. The study
compared changes in crime rates in two time periods, 1991-93 (before 3 Strikes) and 1995-97
(after 3 Strikes) (Males et al., 1999; Schiraldi, Colburn, & Lotke, 2004).
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The simple before-and-after comparisons used by these advocates and critics of the law
are easy to comprehend but lack methodological rigor. They fail to account for important
factors, such as the fact that crime rates had begun to decline before Three Strikes was
introduced, and they omit other key variables that influence crime rates.
More sophisticated analyses have been conducted by academic researchers, producing a
wide range of conclusions. Employing a two-stage least squares model to analyze California
county-level panel data from 1983 through 1996, Shepherd (2002b) concludes that the two- and
three-strikes provisions of California’s law resulted in significant deterrent effects on murder,
assault, robbery, and burglary rates.2 In contrast, other scholarly studies, using various data
sources and methodologies, find that the law’s impacts on crime have been modest (Stolzenberg
& D'Alessio, 1997; Zimring, Kamin, & Hawkins, 1999), nonexistent or undetectable (Austin et
al., 1999; Beres & Griffith, 1998; Males et al., 1999), or even counterproductive. Some
researchers have concluded that the laws have resulted in an increase in homicides as offenders
facing strikes sentences seek to evade law enforcement authorities or eliminate witnesses
(Kovandzic, Sloan, & Vieraitis, 2002, 2004; Marvell & Moody, 2001). Studies also link Three
Strikes to other actual or predicted unintended consequences, such as strain on local law
enforcement operations, jail systems, and courts (Austin, 1994; Austin et al., 1999; California
Youth and Adult Correctional Agency - Board of Corrections, 1996), prison overcrowding and
increased rates of release from prison (Dickey, 1996, 1998), and escalating costs in the long-term
as affected prisoners grow older and require more expensive care (Auerhahn, 1999, 2002; R. S.
King & Mauer, 2001; Schmertmann, Amankwaa, & Long, 1998). Finally, some scholars have
pointed out that mandatory sentences like Three Strikes have led to tremendous social costs, such
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as those associated with mass incarceration of offenders and their eventual re-entry to society
(Mauer & Chesney-Lind, 2002; Travis, 2002; Travis & Waul, 2003).
Several reports completed in the 1990s and early 2000s include the caveat that sufficient
data to measure the law’s full impacts on crime might not be available for several years,
particularly because the incapacitation effects associated with lengthy mandatory sentences
would only be observed after affected offenders completed the sentences they would already
have faced in the law’s absence (Austin et al., 1999; Greenwood et al., 1994; J. R. Ramirez &
Crano, 2003). Now that more than a decade has passed since the law’s adoption, sufficient postimplementation data exist to conduct more rigorous analyses. Ramirez and Crano (2003) use
ARIMA and regression models to analyze monthly statewide crime and arrest data from
California for the years 1983 to 1998. Controlling for pre-existing crime trends, they detect few
immediate impacts of Three Strikes, some deterrence and incapacitation effects over time for
violent and premeditated “instrumental” offenses and for “minor” crimes not targeted by Three
Strikes, and no impacts on drug offenses. Worrall’s 2004 study uses a cross-sectional time series
model with fixed effects for years and counties to examine Three Strikes’ effects using data on
California’s counties from 1989 to 2000. In contrast to Ramirez and Crano (2003), Worrall’s
investigation finds that the law has “virtually no deterrent or incapacitative effects on serious
crime” once county fixed effects are taken into account (Worrall, 2004). Kovandzic, Sloan, and
Vieratis (2002, 2004) apply cross-sectional time series analysis to data for 188 cities in the
United States from 1980 to 2000. In their 2004 study, the authors find that while significant
declines in crime trends could be found for some offenses in some states in the aftermath of
Three Strikes’ adoption, significant increases could be found in roughly the same number of
states, suggesting either that the findings were either random statistical artifacts or that the law
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has both positive and negative impacts that cancel each other out on the whole (Kovandzic et al.,
2004). The only exception to this finding was for rates of homicide, for which more significant
increases than declines were found (Kovandzic et al., 2004).
Contributions of the Present Study to the Literature
This paper examines the effects of Three Strikes on crime not only in California, but also
throughout the nation, using state-level data for all fifty states. The methods used in this paper
are similar to those used in some of the more methodologically sophisticated recent studies (e.g.
Worrall 2004, Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieraitis 2004), but here they are applied to state-level,
rather than city-level, data. The dataset includes statistics from the years 1986 through 2005.
This twenty-year time series provides the opportunity to model trends in crime and other
variables for eight or nine years before, and eleven or twelve years after, the implementation of
Three Strikes in most states (most of the laws were passed in 1994 or 1995). The analysis
consists of regression models applied to cross-sectional time series data with state and year fixed
effects. The inclusion of state fixed effects makes it possible to account for the underlying
variation in crime rates between states. As demonstrated by Worrall (2004) using county data,
omission of pre-existing unit-level trends from time-series analyses can lead to misleading
results. Year fixed effects account for nationwide crime trends that may be associated with
factors not directly included in the model. Additional variables representing individual statelevel crime trends are also included for states that adopted Three Strikes as well as non-adopting
states. If these trends are not incorporated into the analysis, the impacts of Three Strikes are
likely to be overestimated because crime rates had begun to drop even before Three Strikes was
passed in most jurisdictions, and crime fell in jurisdictions without Three Strikes laws as well as
in those that did pass them. Alternative explanations that have been cited to explain changes in
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crime rates are also taken into account by including relevant economic, demographic, budget,
and alternative policy variables in the model.

Comparison of Three Strikes Statutes in California and Other States
“Three Strikes and You’re Out” and other habitual offender mandatory sentencing laws
exist in half of the American states. The laws and the years in which they were adopted are
summarized in Table 1 below.
[Table 1 about here]
While Three Strikes laws have punishment and deterrence among their goals, these
policies are also based, in part, on the idea that a small proportion of habitual offenders commit
most crimes, and that incarcerating the most active and incorrigible criminals will therefore
dramatically improve public safety.3 “Selective incapacitation,” as this approach has been
called, seeks to target the most dangerous offenders and design sentencing policies to incarcerate
them during their most crime-prone years (Auerhahn, 1999, 2003; Gottfredson & Gottfredson,
1994; Greenwood & Abrahamse, 1982). Policymakers have not reached a consensus among
regarding the most effective approach to selective incapacitation. The number of offenses that
trigger a “strike” charge, the categories of crimes that count as strikes, and the sentences
mandated upon conviction vary from state to state (Caulkins, 2001; Clark et al., 1997).
California’s version of the law differs markedly from statutes adopted elsewhere.
California’s Three Strikes policy consists of two primary components. First, if a defendant has a
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prior serious or violent felony conviction (i.e. “strike”) and is convicted of any subsequent
felony, the sentence for the current felony is automatically doubled (Legislative Analyst's Office,
2005). This is often referred to as the “second strike” provision. Second, if a defendant has two
or more strikes, any subsequent felony conviction carries a mandatory “third strike” sentence of
twenty-five years to life in prison (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005). In California, twenty-one
violent felonies, listed in California penal code section 667.5(c), and forty-two serious felony
offenses, attempted offenses, or enhancements, listed in California penal code section 1192.7(c)
(with some overlap between these two groups), can count as strikes. The law requires a state
prison term (rather than jail or probation), restricts “good time” credits to twenty percent, and
prohibits plea bargaining. The key difference between California and other states is that the
offender’s current crime need not be serious or violent. About five hundred different felony
offenses can set the second- or third-strike provisions of the law into motion (Moore, 1999).
By August 1998, California had sentenced had 40,511 offenders, including 36,043
second-strikers, under the law (Dickey, 1998). In comparison, Washington, the first state to pass
a Three Strikes statute, had sentenced approximately 120 third-strike offenders and three secondstrike offenders under its more restrictive law (Dickey, 1998). Most other states and the federal
system had sentenced even fewer prisoners (Gatland, 1998; McMurry, 1997). The relatively
narrow Three Strikes laws in most jurisdictions limit strikes-eligible offenses to a small number
of violent felonies, and require three violent convictions to trigger a mandatory sentence. In
some states, the law can be set into motion by more or fewer strikes. Maryland’s law, for
example, mandates life without parole when an offender accrues four strikes from a short list of
violent felonies, and requires that separate prison terms were served for the first three offenses
(Clark et al., 1997). Georgia’s law stipulates life without parole after the second violent felony
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conviction from a list of specified offenses. However, far fewer offenses are covered by
Georgia’s law than by California’s (Clark et al., 1997). By the middle of 1998, three states that
had implemented Three Strikes in 1994 or 1995 had not yet sentenced any offenders under the
law, twelve other states had a dozen or fewer Three Strikes convictions, and the federal system
had sentenced only 35 offenders under its version of Three Strikes (Dickey, 1998).
Telephone and e-mail interviews with state criminal justice authorities conducted from
September through November 2006 found that after more than a decade in place, Three Strikes
still had not been used with great frequency in states other than California, because few offenders
were eligible to be charged under the far more restrictive terms of most states’ Three Strikes
laws. Washington had sentenced 281 offenders under its Three Strikes statute and 66 offenders
under a Two Strikes provision (State of Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2006).
Nevada had 349 “habitual offenders” in its corrections system, and the South Carolina
Department of Corrections reported seventeen inmates sentenced under its Three Strikes
legislation and 334 inmates sentenced under the state’s Two Strikes legislation as of June 30,
2006.4 The Virginia Dept of Corrections reported 316 “three time losers” including individuals
convicted of murder, robbery and drug offenses out of 35,000 classified inmates as of Dec 30,
2005.5 Pennsylvania’s “repeat offender mandatory sentences – second, third, and subsequent
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strikes – have rarely been imposed,” with “only about ten to fifteen cases per year.”6 The
Arkansas Department of Correction housed 56 Three Strikes inmates, North Carolina reported
twenty-six convictions up to July 31, 2006, Wisconsin had twenty-five cases, Tennessee had
twelve, and other states had also made sparing use of the law, with only eight inmates in New
Jersey and three in Vermont serving “Three Strikes” sentences, and five inmates sentenced under
Maryland’s “Four Strikes” law.7 Nine “Three-Time Felony Offenders” and five “Repeat Sexual
Batterers” had been sentenced under Florida’s law, which also includes separate provisions for
drug trafficking and offenses against law enforcement officers and senior citizens.8 Alaska
reported two Three Strikes cases, Connecticut reported one case, and Montana and Utah reported

6

Personal communication by e-mail from Douglas E. Hoffman, Director, Center for Research, Evaluation, and

Statistical Analysis, Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (September 15, 2006).
7

Dr. Mike Cannon, Research and Planning, Arkansas Department of Correction; Richard Burkhart, North Carolina

Policy and Development Analyst II; Kristi Waits, Wisconsin Sentencing Commission; Mike Gasiecki, Statistical
Analyst Supervisor, Tennessee Dept. of Correction; Matthew Schuman, New Jersey Department of Correction; John
Perry, Vermont Department of Corrections; Robert Gibson, Director, Planning and Statistics, Maryland Department
of Public Safety and Correctional Services. Personal communication via telephone and e-mail received between
September 13, 2006 and September 27, 2006.
8

“Of the inmate population on June 30, 2006, a total of 2,547 offenders have been sentenced to Florida’s prison

system under one or more of the provisions of the Three Time Felony Offender Law.” Aside from the nine ThreeTime offenders and five “Repeat Sexual Batters,” the vast majority (2,398) were incarcerated for “Drug
Trafficking,” 114 were sentenced under other sections regarding aggravated assault or battery on a law enforcement
officer, and the rest (21) had violated another provision protecting senior citizens from assault and battery. Florida
statistics and quotation provided by David Ensley, Bureau of Research and Data Analysis, Florida Department of
Corrections, July 17, 2006.

9

that their Three Strikes laws had never been used.9 Every state other than California reported
fewer than 400 second- and third-strikes convictions since the passage of Three Strikes. In
contrast, by the end of 2003, a total of 80,087 second-strikers and 7,332 third-strikers had been
admitted to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (California District
Attorney's Association, 2004). The total has most likely exceeded 100,000 “strikers” by now.
California’s Three Strikes policy is particularly atypical in that it is widely applied
towards nonviolent offenders. As of 2005, thirty-seven percent of second- and third-strike
offenders had been incarcerated for “crimes against persons,” thirty percent for property crimes,
twenty-three percent for drug offenses, and ten percent for other offenses such as weapons
possession (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005). In contrast, 96 percent of the cases prosecuted
under Three Strikes in Washington by March 2006 involved violent offenses (State of
Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2006).10 Most states’ Three Strikes laws are
even more narrowly written than Washington’s: very few offenses are eligible to be counted as
strikes, and all three “strikes” and the current offense must be violent for Three Strikes to be
applied (Clark et al., 1997; National Conference of State Legislatures, 1996).
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California’s Three Strikes statute was designed to be substantially broader than the Three
Strikes law in any other state.11 This distinction was reaffirmed by California’s voters in
November 2004, when Proposition 66, a ballot initative that would have brought California’s
statute more in line with Three Strikes laws in other states by requiring that all three offenses be
serious or violent, was defeated at the polls (Furillo, 2004; Lundstrom, 2004; Walters, 2004).12
Because of the tremendous difference in scope and scale, one might expect California’s law to
influence crime rates differently than Three Strikes laws in other states. Most research has
focused on impacts in California (Auerhahn, 2002, 2003; Greenwood et al., 1994; J. R. Ramirez
& Crano, 2003; Shepherd, 2002; Stolzenberg & D'Alessio, 1997; Walsh, 1999; Worrall, 2004).
The analysis in this paper examines the effects of Three Strikes legislation in California as well
as in the rest of the nation, but the statistical models are designed to treat California’s Three
Strikes policy as distinct from the policies in other states.

Hypothesis
The primary purpose of the analyses that follow is to determine whether Three Strikes
laws have had significantly greater effects on crime in California than elsewhere in the United
States. Because California’s law affects many more criminals than the law in any other state, the
11
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remorseless repeat offender (Moore, 1999).
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impacts of Three Strikes in California on crime rates are expected to be greater than the effects
on the de minimis laws in place in most other states that have any such law. The infrequentlyapplied laws in states other than California are not expected to reduce crime via either deterrence
or incapacitation.

Data and Methodology
The unit of observation in the analyses in this paper is the state-year. The data are
measured at the state level, and the dataset covers all fifty American states for each of the
seventeen years from 1986 through 2005, for a total of one thousand observations. State-level
data are substantively appropriate to the task at hand. Three Strikes laws are adopted at the state
level of government, and this paper seeks to assess the effects of the law’s presence or absence
across multiple states. County-to-county heterogeneity in Three Strikes usage exists within the
state of California because district attorneys and judges exercise discretion in their
implementation of the law (Walsh, 1999; Zimring, Hawkins, & Kamin, 2001), but most states
other than California have applied the law so infrequently that an analysis at a lower level of
aggregation would not be practical or meaningful. Thus, studies that rely on county-level data
are generally limited to examining the effects of Three Strikes in California. A second benefit of
state-level data is availability. Time series are available for all of the relevant crime data,
multiple measures of economic well-being, demographic statistics including race/ethnicity and
age, and budget statistics for all fifty states.
There do exist drawbacks to using state-level data. When city, county, state, or countrylevel data are used, aggregation bias becomes a concern. Heterogeneity among units is “washed
out” when data are combined into average values (Spelman, 2005; Trumbull, 1989). In addition,
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aggregate data may result in biased inferences if information loss is nonrandom (G. King, 1997).
For example, intentional or unintentional underreporting of crime incidents by certain local
police departments, or underreporting of certain types of crimes by individual victims, may lead
to county or state-level data that produce biased, sometimes inflated, estimates of deterrent
effects (Cherry, 1999; Trumbull, 1989; Worrall & Pratt, 2004). Unfortunately, limitations like
these are inherent in studies that rely on aggregate data. Despite the potential shortcomings of
state-level data, this level of aggregation is appropriate for the nationwide analysis in this paper.
The law has been adopted at the state level, and outside of California, with the exception of only
a handful of states that have applied the law to more than a dozen offenders a year, little variance
in the number of Three Strikes cases can be found between units smaller than the state, as the
number of inmates affected by the law in nearly every county in most years has been zero or
close to zero.
Dependent Variables
The analyses that follow examine the impacts of Three Strikes policies on the seven
individual crime categories reported annually by local law enforcement agencies to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. They are (1) murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, (2) forcible rape,
(3) robbery, (4) aggravated assault, (5) burglary, (6) larceny-theft, and (7) motor vehicle theft.13
Among these seven offenses, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft can be described as
primarily “instrumental crimes” (J. R. Ramirez & Crano, 2003). These offenses, committed for
material gain, are likely to involve advance planning or decision-making, while violent offenses,
such as homicide, rape, or aggravated assault, are more likely to be committed out of anger or
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passion. Although the FBI categorizes robbery as a violent offense, it is usually “instrumental”
in nature. The distinction between instrumental and violent offenses may have implications for
the effectiveness of deterrence efforts via Three Strikes laws: “instrumental” crimes may be
deterred more readily not only because of the more “rational” nature of the offenses, but also
because the marginal increases in sentence length are greatest for less-serious felonies that would
carry the shortest sentences in the absence of Three Strikes.
Policy Variables
The primary independent variables of interest are those representing the presence of
“Three Strikes and You’re Out” laws. Additional attention is given in the model to California,
which has an anomalous Three Strikes law, and to the state of Washington, which implemented
Three Strikes earliest. Washington has one of the most widely implemented policies outside
California. The method of coding these policy interventions is explained in further detail below.
As a test of whether other policy changes deserve credit for changes in crime rates, a
second policy intervention, Truth in Sentencing, is also included in the model. Truth in
Sentencing (TIS) policies, requiring certain sentenced offenders to serve 85 percent or more of
their sentences, gained popularity in the United States around the same time that Three Strikes
laws began to proliferate. TIS laws with an 85 percent requirement were adopted in 28 states,
with encouragement from the U.S. Congress in the form of formula-based federal grants
authorized in the 1994 Violent Offender Incarceration/Truth in Sentencing (VOI/TIS) Act
(Sabol, Rosich, Kane, Kirk, & Dubin, 2002; Turner, Fain, Greenwood, Chen, & Chiesa, 2001;
Turner, Greenwood, Fain, & Chiesa, 2006; U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998). States with
TIS in place overlap partially with those that adopted Three Strikes. Separate terms are
introduced in the model to represent the presence of Three Strikes and TIS in California, Three
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Strikes in Washington, and TIS in Washington. The variable representing California’s Three
Strikes policy measures changes in the dependent variables that took place after 1994. Since
California implemented both Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing in 1994, it is not possible,
using annual data, to separate the effects of Three Strikes from those of Truth in Sentencing.14
However, Truth in Sentencing laws vary far less from state to state than Three Strikes laws, in
part because the U.S. Department of Justice required state TIS laws to satisfy specific criteria in
order to earn federal VOI/TIS grants (Turner et al., 2001). The grant program stipulated that
states had to require offenders convicted of murder, criminal sexual assault, robbery and
aggravated assault to serve at least 85 percent of their sentences, or demonstrate that time served
in prison by these offenders averaged at least 85 percent (Ditton & Wilson, 1999). Because of
the relative uniformity in TIS policies, California’s Truth in Sentencing law is not expected to
have effects on crime noticeably different from the effects of TIS policies in other states. In
Washington State, TIS with an 85 percent time-served requirement was adopted in 1990, three
years before Three Strikes was passed; therefore, the effects of the two policies in Washington
can be estimated using two separate independent variables.
Several control variables are included in the analyses, corresponding to factors that are
believed to influence crime rates. These include measures of economic well-being
(unemployment rate, poverty rate, and median household income), state and local government
spending (percent of budget spent on police, corrections, and education), and demographic
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composition of the population (proportion of the population in several different age groups,
percent African-American, and percent Hispanic).
Regression Model
The impacts of Three Strikes are empirically estimated in this paper using time-series
cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis with fixed effects. This method can be applied when data are
available for numerous observations over a series of points in time. TSCS analysis of state-level
data is useful for the study of quasi-experiments like state-level policy interventions; it “provides
control groups because the other 49 states act as controls when analyzing each individual state
law, and permits one to enter a large number of control variables” (Marvell & Moody, 1996).
Researchers can look for consistent effects of new legislation in states that have widely varying
“starting points” in terms of existing crime rates and whose implementation of new laws
occurred in several different years. Other benefits include substantial increases in sample size
compared to panel data or time series only data, and therefore more degrees of freedom, which
allows for inclusion of more control variables and improves the statistical efficiency of the
estimates (Sayrs, 1989; Stimson, 1985).
The linear regression model used here measures whether the implementation of Three
Strikes and Truth in Sentencing resulted in faster or slower growth or declines in crime rates.
The model has the following functional form:
ln (Dependent Variable) =
α + 1 (Underlying trend in Three Strikes states)
+ 2 (New trend in Three Strikes states after the law)
+ 3 (Three Strikes dummy variable)
+ 4 (Underlying trend in California)
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+ 5 (New trend in California after Three Strikes & TIS)
+ 6 (California Three Strikes dummy variable)
+ 7 (Underlying trend Washington)
+ 8 (New trend in Washington after Three Strikes)
+ 9 (New trend in Washington after TIS)
+ 10 (Washington Three Strikes dummy variable)
+ 11 (Underlying trend in TIS states)
+ 12 (New trend in TIS states after the law)
+ 13 (Unemployment rate)it
+ 14 (Percent of population in poverty)it
+ 15 (Statewide median household income in tens of thousands of 2006 dollars)it
+ 16 (Percent of population that is African-American)it
+ 17 (Percent of population that is Hispanic)it
+ 18 (Percent of population under age 5)it
+ 19 (Percent of population ages 5 to 17)it
+ 20 (Percent of population ages 18 to 24)it
+ 21 (Percent of population ages 25 to 44)it
+ 22 (Percent of population ages 65 and up)it
+ 23…42 (Year Fixed Effects)
+ 43…92 (State Fixed Effects)

The dependent variables (crime rates) are natural-logarithm transformed, for ease of
interpretation, to approximate a normal distribution more closely, and to reduce
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heteroskedasticity. In regressions of the natural logarithm of a dependent variable on
untransformed continuous independent variables, the coefficients on the independent variables
(e.g. unemployment rate, percentage ages 18-24) can be interpreted as the percentage change in
Y (i.e. crime rate) that results from a one unit increase in X, at the mean values of the
independent variables. A one-unit increase in each of the dummy variables representing Three
Strikes or TIS can be substantively interpreted as the presence of that policy.
The subscript i represents state, and the subscript t represents year. The term “Year Fixed
Effects” represents a series of year dummy variables (1987 to 2005, with 1986 as the reference),
and the term “State Fixed Effects” represents a series of state dummy variables. Year fixed
effects are necessary because crime trends were not flat before or after the implementation of the
law. Crime rates skyrocketed throughout the 1980s, then began to decline shortly before most
Three Strikes laws went into effect and continued to fall after the laws were in place. If the
downward turn in crime rates preceding the introduction of Three Strikes is not taken into
consideration, the crime-reduction impact of the law is likely to be overestimated. Year fixed
effects serve as a proxy for the numerous excluded factors that may have influenced national
crime trends over the time period covered by the dataset. State fixed effects are included
because the rates of crime vary widely from state to state. These fixed effects control for
excluded factors that affect interstate variation in crime. Individual dummy variables allow each
state to have a different Y-intercept. Because great deal of variation exists between states in the
crime rates that serve as dependent variables, the state dummy variables are likely to absorb
many of the apparent impacts that might be observed if state fixed effects were omitted. A
regression model that includes state fixed effects will therefore produce conservative estimates of
the impacts of Three Strikes and other independent variables, only measuring the effects that the
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independent variables would have had on changes in crime within states over time (D. R.
Johnson, 1995). In this analysis, the results of a test of fixed vs. random effects using an
artificial regression approach indicates that the regressors are correlated with the group-specific
errors associated with the individual states; the fixed effects specification is more consistent than
the random-effects model for these data.15
It is quite possible that Three Strikes and non-Three Strikes states differ not only in their
levels of crime after the laws’ implementation, but also in the rates of change in crime that
preceded the adoption of the policy. These differences may even have played a role in states’
decisions regarding whether to enact Three Strikes. For example, legislators or voters in states
experiencing unusually rapid growth (or slower declines) in crime rates could have been more
likely to decide that existing policies were inadequate and Three Strikes was necessary. With
this in mind, the variables representing the effects of Three Strikes are designed so that postThree Strikes trends in crime are measured while controlling for underlying pre-Three-Strikes
crime trends. Separate variables represent underlying pre-implementation trends in Three Strikes
states and trends in Three Strikes states after Three Strikes. The “Underlying Trend” variable is
a simple linear trend, coded 0 for the year t of implementation, -1, -2, -3, ... for the years t-1, t-2,
t-3, etc., and 1, 2, 3, ... for the years t+1, t+2, t+3, etc.
The “New Trend” variables are coded 0 for all years until adoption, then 1, 2, 3, ... for
years after implementation. The coefficients associated with these variables represent the
differences between Three Strikes and non-Three Strikes states in the year-to-year changes in
crime rates before and after the passage of “Three Strikes and You’re Out.”

15

This test was conducted using the “xtoverid” function in STATA because the Hausman test produced undefined

results. Details available at http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456779.html.
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In addition, dummy variables representing the presence of Three Strikes nationally, in
California, and in Washington are included. One might expect the post-Three-Strikes dummy
variable to have a negative and significant coefficient if a new Three Strikes law has had a
deterrent effect that would lead some would-be offenders to cease or curtail their criminal
activity immediately after the law’s adoption. The post-Three-Strikes trend variable would have
a negative and significant coefficient if Three Strikes laws have led to effects that grow over
time, such as the incapacitation effects associated with increased length of incarceration.

Findings and Discussion
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 2 below. For ease of
presentation, coefficients corresponding to the individual year and state dummy variables are
omitted from the table.
[Table 2 about here]

Effects of Three Strikes on Different Crime Types in California vs. Other States
The analysis produces both expected and unexpected results with regard to the impacts of
Three Strikes on crime rates. The coefficient associated with the crime trend in Three Strikes
states after the law’s adoption is negative and statistically significant for each of the
“instrumental offenses”: robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. The effects
are not large, but they are consistent. Relative to the declines in crime already taking place
nationwide and captured by the year fixed effects, the robbery rate in Three Strikes states fell 3
percent more rapidly, in the years after the law’s adoption. The rate of burglary fell 1.8 percent
more quickly, larceny-theft fell 1.1 percent faster, and motor vehicle theft fell 2 percent faster in
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Three Strikes states each year the law was in place. At first glance, this seems to support the
hypothesis that policies intended to deter crime are most effective against offenses that are likely
to involve premeditation or rational decision-making, as opposed to “crimes of passion.”
However, the Three Strikes dummy variable, which is intended to capture deterrent effects, is
associated with non-significant coefficients for every category of crime except murder. These
findings are somewhat puzzling, particularly because nonviolent offenses like burglary, larceny,
and motor vehicle theft are not eligible for sentencing under Three Strikes in most states, and
therefore rates of those offenses would not be expected to decline as a result of Three Strikesrelated incapacitation effects.
In California, the coefficient on the Three Strikes dummy variable was negative and
significant for two offenses: motor vehicle theft (β = -.328, p < .05) and robbery (β = -.271, p <
.10), suggesting that some deterrent effects might exist with regard to these types of crime.
Contrary to expectations, although statistically significant crime-reduction effects on some crime
types were found for Three Strikes policies nationwide, few additional incapacitation effects
were measurable in California, the state in which the greatest deterrence and incapacitation
effects would be expected. (The moderately-used Three Strikes law in Washington also had no
extra effects beyond those shared by Three Strikes states throughout the country.16)
The preceding findings lead to the question: if about 100,000 offenders have been
sentenced under California’s Three Strikes law, why would the effects on crime in California be
mostly undetectable? A brief examination of prison capacities and populations may provide part
16

The only statistically significant additional effect of Washington’s Three Strikes law was found for burglary, but

this effect was in the “wrong” (positive) direction (p < .05). Here it may be useful to note that the sheer number of
coefficient estimates produced in these analyses virtually guarantees a few “false positive” findings of statistical
significance.
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of the answer. Table 3 below displays California’s prison capacity and prison population
statistics for the period from 1986 to 2005. Neither capacity nor population has grown to an
extent commensurate with the number of offenders sentenced under Three Strikes. From 1994,
the year of the law’s passage, until 2005, design capacity increased by 18,884 beds, while the
population of the state’s severely overcrowded prisons increased by 47,898 inmates. Due to
constraints on population growth, the entry to prison of new inmates with mandatory sentences,
or lengthened sentences for certain inmates, can occur only if other inmates are released, and a
Three Strikes incapacitation effect on crime would be observed only if the inmates leaving prison
are less likely to offend than those who are entering or staying longer as a result of the law.
Contrary to the theory of “selective incapacitation,” California’s law could actually create the
unintended effect of forcing authorities to use limited prison space to warehouse nonviolent
offenders and those who have aged beyond the peak of their “criminal careers.”17 Further
research is needed to examine this more closely.
[Table 3 about here]
An alternative explanation may be that a crime reduction effect does exist, but it cannot
be measured with statistical significance in this analysis due to the limitations of the statistical
tests used here. While the coefficient estimates associated with the California post-Three Strikes
trend variables are not statistically significant, the analyses do produce consistently negative
coefficients for every crime category except rape.

17

Unlike many other prisoners, inmates sentenced under Three Strikes may not have their prison terms reduced by

more than 20 percent using “good time” credits, while some other inmates may be eligible for up to a 50 percent
reduction for “good time” (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005).
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A noteworthy incidental finding from this analysis is that statistically significant and
positive coefficients were found for the variable representing the crime trend in Three Strikes
states before the adoption of the law for robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. In
other words, the states that passed Three Strikes laws did so as they were experiencing slower
declines (compared to non-adopting states) in their rates of several crimes. This suggests that the
desire to gain greater control over crime rates may have provided an impetus for legislatures or
voters (through ballot initiatives) to support and enact “get tough” policies such as Three Strikes.
Another notable finding is that the Three Strikes dummy variable carries a positive and
significant (p < .01) coefficient for only one category of crime, murder. Murder rates appear to
have increased about 12.9 percent more rapidly (or fallen 12.9 percent less rapidly) in states with
Three Strikes laws in place. This result is consistent, in both direction and magnitude, with the
findings of some prior researchers (Kovandzic et al., 2002, 2004; Marvell & Moody, 2001), who
have speculated that the fear of a long mandatory sentence may motivate some criminals to
attempt to eliminate witnesses or resist law enforcement officers. It is surprising, however, that
the effect is observed nationwide but is not especially pronounced in California, the state with
the broadest and most highly publicized Three Strikes law.
Although skeptics might believe that many narrowly-drawn Three Strikes policies may
have been designed to create the appearance of getting tough on crime while actually being
applied to very few offenders, the results of the analysis suggest that some real effects may be
observable. On the other hand, given the small number of criminals incarcerated under most
Three Strikes laws, the crime effects in Three Strikes states other than California cannot be
attributed entirely to the incapacitation of habitual offenders. There are two plausible alternative
explanations. The laws may have had deterrent effects that somehow increased over time. This
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explanation is consistent with the finding that greater impacts were found for more readily
deterred instrumental offenses, though it is unclear why the effects would grow over the years.
Another possibility is that one or more variables left out of the model are responsible. For
example, the states that adopted Three Strikes may have enacted other crime prevention
measures (other than Truth in Sentencing, which is included in the model) along with their Three
Strikes policies.
Effects of Other Included Variables
The analysis indicates that Truth in Sentencing (TIS), another sentencing policy that
gained popularity at about the same time as Three Strikes, had a far smaller impact on crime than
Three Strikes. A statistically significant coefficient is associated with Truth in Sentencing
adoption for only one offense category, burglary. There were no additional effects associated
with TIS in Washington State or in California. The lack of observable effects of Truth in
Sentencing is not very surprising, for a few reasons. TIS extends the length of existing
sentences, rather than sending offenders to prison who otherwise would not have been
incarcerated. The marginal incapacitation effects associated with TIS do not take effect until the
end of the portion of the sentence that an inmate would already have served. TIS is targeted
primarily toward violent criminals, though its scope is wider in some states. Finally, the
distinction between TIS and non-TIS states is blurred by the fact that many states that did not
meet the Department of Justice’s 85 percent time served requirement for TIS funding
nonetheless increased the proportion of time served by violent offenders (Turner et al., 2006).
Economic factors influence the rates of some crimes, particularly instrumental offenses.
The unemployment rate has a positive and significant association with three types of crime, rape,
robbery, and burglary. Consistent with criminal opportunity theory (higher rates of poverty
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mean fewer attractive targets), the proportion of state residents living in poverty has no effect on
violent crime, but it is significantly and negatively associated with the rates of burglary and
larceny. The proportion of state and local expenditures spent on corrections is associated with
significant and negative coefficients for robbery and motor vehicle theft. The proportions spent
on police and education have few significant effects.
The variable representing the percentage of the population that is African-American has a
negative and significant coefficient in the models for rape, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor
vehicle theft, indicating that the rates of these offenses are lower where the proportion of
African-Americans in the population is higher, when other factors are controlled. Considering
the vast literature on the relatively high rates of criminal offending and victimization among
African-Americans, this outcome contradicts expectations. However, because this variable is
relatively time-invariant within jurisdictions, the coefficient estimates associated with this
variable in a fixed-effects model may be unstable (D. R. Johnson, 1995). Due to immigration,
the Hispanic proportion of the population has varied more than the African-American population
over the time period included in the dataset.18 This variable is associated with a positive
coefficient in the models for burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. As one would expect,
the percentage of the population in the most crime-prone age group, 18 to 24, is associated with
higher levels of several offenses: murder, rape, burglary, and motor vehicle theft.
The inclusion of variables representing underlying crime trends is essential to the
accuracy of analyses of Three Strikes’ impacts. When time-series cross-sectional regression

18

According to the United States Census Bureau, the Hispanic population in the United States has increased by

more than 50 percent since 1990 (Guzman, 2001). Forty percent of the Hispanic population is foreign born, and 46
percent of the foreign born population entered the United States between 1990 and 2000 (R. Ramirez, 2004).
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analysis is performed on the same data without accounting for underlying crime trends in the
model, dramatically different results are produced. An improperly specified analysis using only
dichotomous dummy variables, rather than pre- and post-implementation trend variables, to
represent the absence or presence of Three Strikes and Truth in Sentencing generates results (not
shown here) that appear to indicate that California’s Three Strikes law has been an enormous
success, attributing declines in crime to California’s Three Strikes law ranging from about 17
percent for burglary to 31 percent for motor vehicle theft. When pre- and post-Three Strikes
crime trends are included in the models, the analysis reveals that the drops in crime seemingly
linked to the uniquely broad Three Strikes policy in California are likely to have occurred even if
the state had adopted a more limited Three Strikes policy, as several other states did. These
observations support those of a previous study (Worrall, 2004) that also controlled for preexisting crime trends while using county, rather than state, data.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
“Three Strikes and You’re Out” laws have been adopted by half of the American states,
but California’s policy is much broader than the corresponding habitual offender laws adopted
elsewhere. While no other state has incarcerated more than 400 offenders under its Three Strikes
law, over 100,000 convictions have resulted from California’s policy. Yet, the approach taken in
California has not been dramatically more effective at controlling crime than other states’ efforts.
Some potential reasons for this finding were discussed above, but the question of why a law of
this scale and scope has not had greater impacts on crime deserves further attention from
researchers.
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Despite the limited usage of Three Strikes statutes in states other than California, the
law’s presence throughout the United States is associated with accelerated rates of decline for
robbery, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft, all of which are potentially deterrable
“instrumental offenses.” This finding, in conjunction with data on the relatively few inmates
incarcerated under Three Strikes policies in most states, suggests that any crime reduction
associated with the presence of Three Strikes outside California should probably be attributed to
deterrence effects rather than incarceration effects.
The analysis finds that pre-existing conditions in states where Three Strikes was passed
differed fundamentally from those in states where Three Strikes was not adopted. Before
implementing the law, Three Strikes states were experiencing more rapid increases (or slower
decreases) in crime trends than non-adopting states. Concern regarding crime rates or patterns
may have contributed to the policy decisions made by the public or legislatures in these states.
More thorough analysis of factors that contribute to the policy adoption decision, using the
passage of Three Strikes as a dependent variable, would be an interesting topic for future
research.
This paper’s findings regarding Three Strikes’ impacts in California may disappoint
proponents of that state’s approach to Three Strikes. It may, however, provide useful lessons for
policymakers to consider in the future. One clear conclusion from the preceding analyses is that
the “toughest” sentencing policy is not necessarily the most effective option. The narrowlyconstructed and seldom-used habitual offender policies adopted in many states appear to produce
results comparable to those observed in California.
Policies like Three Strikes were not the only factors likely to have contributed to the
decline in crime throughout the mid- to late 1990s. Other policy initiatives, which were not
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operationalized as control variables in the preceding analyses, have been credited with reducing
crime as well. These include “zero tolerance” or “quality of life” policing strategies in New
York City and other locations (Bratton, 1996; Katz, Webb, & Schaefer, 2001; Kelling & Bratton,
1988), the passage of right-to-carry concealed weapons laws in several states (Lott, 1998; Lott &
Mustard, 1997; McDonald, 1999; Plassmann & Tideman, 2001), and many other efforts
throughout the United States. Criminologists have also noted that the rise and fall of crack
cocaine markets, and the gun violence directly and indirectly related to the drug trade, have
coincided with trends in violent crime rates (Beres & Griffith, 1998; Blumstein & Rosenfeld,
1998; Bowling, 1999; Grogger, 2006; B. Johnson, Golub, & Dunlap, 2000; Wallman &
Blumstein, 2005; Witkin, 1998). It is possible that the reductions in crime experienced
throughout the United States from the early 1990s through the early 2000s resulted from many
different forces, including Three Strikes laws in some states, and other, contemporaneous, policy
changes in other places.
Some scholars believe that these changes in crime rates can hardly be explained at all. It
has been suggested that recent drops in crime in many American cities should primarily be
attributed to “regression to the mean” from preceding periods of rapid growth that reached
unusually high peaks (Fagan, Zimring, and Kim, 1998). The causes and correlates of rises and
declines in crime rates are numerous, diverse, and elusive. Thus, researchers and policymakers
must keep in mind that even major changes in sentencing policy may result in only modest
impacts on crime rates.
The nonpartisan California Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates that the state’s Three
Strikes policy currently costs approximately $500 million per year to implement, with expenses
expected to escalate dramatically in the long run, even if the prison population does not expand
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further, due to aging of the inmate population and corresponding growth in medical expenses
(Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005). The implementation of a policy as costly as Three Strikes
results in inevitable opportunity costs, not only within the criminal justice domain, but also in
other vital policy areas. California faced a budget shortfall of $16 billion at the beginning of
2008; in response, the 2008-09 budget set forth by the Governor proposed dramatic across-theboard spending cuts including a reduction of $400 million in payments for K-14 education, cuts
in spending for state universities, reductions in medical benefits for the poor, the suspension of a
cost-of-living adjustment for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, and even the early
release of some prison inmates (California Legislative Analyst's Office, 2008). Scaling back
California’s Three Strikes law could free up millions of dollars a year for the preservation of
important public goods and services in the nation’s most populous state.
Three Strikes, as implemented in California, could be cost-beneficial despite its high
price tag if it were shown to save money by reducing crime, but the results of the present study
indicate that crime effects of a similar magnitude could have been obtained by more efficient
means than California’s unusually broad Three Strikes policy. In a 2001 paper entitled “How
Large Should the Strike Zone Be?” Caulkins describes the trade-offs involved in designing a
Three Strikes statute that is broad in scope (like California’s law) or narrow (like the laws in
Pennsylvania and most other states). He explains that a narrow law is likely to be more costeffective, as it will target high-rate offenders to serve the longest sentences; on the other hand, a
broad law should be expected to have a bigger impact on crime, but at a far higher cost per crime
averted (Caulkins, 2001). To an extent, the results presented above confirm this expectation. In
allowing felony offenses that are neither serious nor violent to trigger second- and third-strike
sentences, California’s policy seems to extend beyond the point of diminishing marginal returns.
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Narrowly-constructed laws, such as those in most other states, appear to be associated with slight
crime reduction effects for certain categories of offenses, but the additional crime-reducing
benefits of California’s far broader policy are small or nonexistent for nearly every category of
crime, while the costs associated with this extra breadth are considerable.
The law has led to less growth in California’s prison population than some initial
forecasts predicted (see, for example, Greenwood et al. 1994), due to factors including declines
in crime and the exercise of discretion by some prosecutors and judges in the law’s
implementation (California District Attorney's Association, 2004; Walsh, 2004).19 Nevertheless,
over 100,000 individuals have already received either second- or third-strike sentences since the
law took effect in 1994 (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005). Along with financial costs, the
increased rate of incarceration imposes enormous human and social costs for sentenced
individuals, their families, and the communities from which inmates come and to which many of
them eventually return (for discussion, see e.g. Mauer & Chesney-Lind, 2002; Travis, 2002;
Travis & Waul, 2003). In California, these social costs are borne disproportionately by AfricanAmerican men, who constitute only about 3 percent of the state’s population but represent
approximately 33 percent of second-strikers and 44 percent of third-strikers among California
prison inmates (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2008; United States

19

“In the furtherance of justice,” prosecutors and judges retain the discretion to dismiss some prior strike offenses in

order to avoid triggering a second-or third-strike sentence (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005). For certain offenses
known as “wobblers,” prosecutors also have the authority to charge cases either as felonies, which could lead to
second- or third-strike sentences for offenders with prior “strikes,” or misdemeanors, which carry a maximum
sentence of one year in jail (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005; Ricciardulli, 2002).
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Census Bureau, 2006).20 Thus, another non-monetary cost of California’s Three Strikes law may
be erosion of the perception of fairness and legitimacy in the state’s criminal sentencing process,
particularly among the most heavily impacted populations.
Three Strikes is one of numerous “get-tough” policies adopted throughout the United
States in response to concerns about rising crime rates in the 1990s. The evidence presented
above indicates that the presence of a Three Strikes law is associated with modest crime
reduction effects nationally, and that California’s version of the law is not considerably more
effective at crime reduction than alternative methods that are narrower in scope. Regardless of
its limited effects on crime, however, California’s Three Strikes policy will continue to produce
tremendous and lasting ramifications for prison population growth, state budgets, and tens of
thousands of human lives, unless the state’s voters decide to reduce the scope of the law at some
point in the future.

20

Overrepresentation of African-Americans among those sentenced under Three Strikes has been found to persist

even when variables such as current offense and prior record are controlled (Chen, 2008).
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Table 1: “Three Strikes” and Similar Repeat Offender Laws in the United States21
State
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Indiana
Kansas
Louisiana
Maryland
Montana
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin

21

Year Passed
(Amended)
2006
1995
1994
1994
1994
1995
1994
1994
1994
1994 (1995)
1994
1995
1995
1995
1994
1994
1995
1995
1995
1994 (1995)
1995
1995
1994 (1995)
1993
1994

Law
Stat. § 12.55.125
S 123
A 971 and Proposition 184
S 196
H 5385
S 168
S 441
H 1063
H 2788
H 18
H 1112
S 66
A 317
A 318
S 73 and 742, Chapter 24
H 39, Part 6, Chapter 22
H 1218
H 93
H 3096
H 2759
H 46
S 51
H 273
Initiative 593
1993 S 781, Act 289

Source for all states except Alaska: National Conference of State Legislatures, “Three Strikes” Legislation

Update, December 1997. Alaska law information obtained via personal communication with Ms. Teri Carnes,
Senior Staff Associate, Alaska Judicial Council, September 22, 2006.

Table 2: Regression Results (Dependent Variables ln-transformed)

Underlying trend in 3-strikes states
Trend in 3-strikes states after 3-strikes
3-strikes dummy
Underlying trend in CA
Trend in CA after 3-strikes
CA 3-strikes dummy
Underlying trend in WA
Trend in WA after 3-strikes
WA 3-strikes dummy
Trend in WA after TIS
Underlying trend in TIS states
Trend in TIS states after TIS
Unemployment rate
% of pop. in poverty

Murd.
Coef.
S.E.
0.005
0.008
-0.007
0.009
0.129 ***
0.048
0.026
0.032
-0.026
0.037
-0.230
0.194
-0.046
0.081
0.016
0.062
0.150
0.198
0.016
0.125
-0.004
0.004
-0.001
0.005
0.007
0.009
-0.004
0.005

Rape
Coef.
S.E.
-0.006
0.005
-0.006
0.006
0.037
0.031
-0.026
0.021
0.003
0.024
0.015
0.128
0.053
0.053
0.007
0.041
-0.077
0.130
-0.075
0.083
-0.004
0.002
0.001
0.003
0.013 **
0.006
0.003
0.003

Robb.
Coef.
S.E.
0.023
0.006
-0.030
0.008
-0.045
0.038
0.018
0.026
-0.037
0.030
-0.271
0.156
-0.007
0.065
0.025
0.050
0.037
0.160
-0.017
0.101
-0.003
0.003
-0.004
0.004
0.015
0.007
0.000
0.004

***
***

*

**

Aggr.
Asslt.
Coef.
S.E.
0.005
0.006
0.006
0.008
0.008
0.038
0.012
0.026
-0.043
0.030
-0.072
0.157
0.007
0.065
-0.033
0.050
-0.019
0.160
0.007
0.101
0.000
0.003
0.003
0.004
-0.039 ***
0.007
0.000
0.004

Burg.
Coef.
S.E.
0.014
0.004
-0.018
0.005
-0.020
0.024
-0.013
0.016
0.007
0.018
-0.081
0.096
-0.076
0.040
0.078
0.031
0.120
0.098
0.018
0.062
0.003
0.002
-0.005
0.002
0.013
0.004
-0.007
0.002

***
***

*
**

**
**
***
***

Larc.
Coef.
S.E.
0.006 **
0.003
-0.011 ***
0.004
-0.007
0.020
-0.022
0.013
0.020
0.015
-0.100
0.081
-0.043
0.034
0.009
0.026
0.014
0.083
0.038
0.052
0.001
0.001
-0.001
0.002
-0.003
0.004
-0.008 ***
0.002

MV
Theft
Coef.
S.E.
0.020
0.007
-0.023
0.008
0.003
0.041
-0.019
0.028
0.045
0.032
-0.328
0.167
0.017
0.070
0.047
0.054
0.051
0.170
-0.006
0.108
0.012
0.003
-0.007
0.004
-0.005
0.008
0.001
0.004

***
***

**

***

Table 2, Continued

Median HH income
% of state/local expenditures on police
% of state/local exp. on corrections
% of state/local exp. on education
% of pop. black
% of pop. Hispanic
% of pop. under age 5
% of pop. ages 5-17
% of pop. ages 18-24
% of pop. ages 25-44
% of pop. ages 65 and up
(Yr. 1987-2005 dummies omitted)
Constant
R-squared within
R-squared between
R-squared overall
N

Murd.
Coef.
S.E.
0.000
0.000
0.023
0.027
-0.009
0.014
0.007
0.002
0.025
0.018
-0.001
0.002
0.023
0.027
-0.017
0.010
0.060
0.013
-0.006
0.009
-0.013
0.015

*

***

*
***

0.829 **
0.400
0.467
0.459
0.443
999

Rape
Coef.
S.E.
0.000
0.000
-0.031
0.018
-0.005
0.009
0.002
0.002
-0.066
0.012
0.000
0.001
-0.150
0.018
-0.008
0.007
0.063
0.008
0.030
0.006
-0.025
0.010

***

***

***

***
***
**

3.536 ***
0.263
0.453
0.057
0.022
999

Robb.
Coef.
S.E.
0.000
0.000
-0.030
0.022
-0.019
0.011
-0.001
0.002
-0.029
0.014
0.000
0.001
-0.004
0.021
-0.053
0.008
0.017
0.010
0.003
0.007
0.063
0.012

***

*

**

***

***

4.561 ***
0.322
0.476
0.194
0.112
999

Aggr.
Asslt.
Coef.
S.E.
0.000
0.000
0.010
0.022
0.015
0.011
0.001
0.002
-0.005
0.014
0.002
0.001
0.055
0.022
-0.055
0.008
0.012
0.010
-0.021
0.007
0.080
0.012

**
***

***
***

5.719 ***
0.324
0.379
0.070
0.014
999

Burg.
Coef.
S.E.
0.000
0.000
-0.021
0.013
-0.011
0.007
-0.001
0.001
-0.024
0.009
0.002
0.001
0.028
0.013
-0.060
0.005
0.012
0.006
0.012
0.004
0.038
0.008

***
***
**
***
**
***
***

7.237 ***
0.199
0.830
0.154
0.004
999

Larc.
Coef.
S.E.
0.000
0.000
-0.006
0.011
-0.008
0.006
-0.002
0.001
-0.017
0.007
0.002
0.001
0.038
0.011
-0.031
0.004
0.002
0.005
0.006
0.004
0.003
0.006

**
**
***
***

8.341 ***
0.167
0.648
0.009
0.020
999

MV
Theft
Coef.
S.E.
0.000
0.000
-0.029
0.023
-0.031
0.012
-0.003
0.002
-0.070
0.015
0.005
0.002
0.188
0.023
-0.085
0.009
0.050
0.011
-0.024
0.008
0.082
0.013

***

***

***
***
***
***
***
***
***

5.574 ***
0.344
0.423
0.065
0.033
999

Table 3: California Prison Capacity and Prison Population, 1986-200522
Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

22

Design Capacity
32,853
41,094
46,279
48,311
52,698
55,692
57,367
63,293
68,366
71,641
72,621
76,352
79,875
80,272
80,467
79,957
80,587
80,487
80,890
87,250

Prison Population
57,725
64,812
73,780
84,338
94,122
98,515
105,467
115,573
121,084
131,745
142,865
152,739
159,201
160,517
160,412
157,295
161,361
164,487
166,556
168,982

Sources: United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners in [Year] reports, 1986

through 2005.

